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0. Introduction 
This paper deals with the comparative analysis of positional equilibria under alternative 
electoral systems. Up to now, most electoral systems have been examined separately and in 
different frameworks. I propose a unified model of elections with sophisticated voting and 
endogenous platform positioning with three and four parties.1  
I assume strategic Nash choice of platforms by candidates, as most of the literature with 
endogenous positioning.  
The behavior of voters is a more controversial issue. Early literature considered sincere 
voting, but this assumption is unreasonable for many situations, and there is strong empirical 
evidence for sophisticated voting (Riker,1973)). Recent literature therefore examined 
sophisticated voting, and even strategic voting (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1988, Besley and 
Coate, 1997...). This paper takes an intermediate view, which was proposed by Myerson 
and Weber (1993): voters are rational and therefore able of sophisticated voting, but are not 
really able to interact with each other. Therefore, they take into account the available 
information regarding how strong the candidates are and try not to waste their vote on 
unlikely winners: they maximize their expected utility.  
 
The literature regarding majority or plurality elections is quite extensive. Negative results 
have been emphasized: plurality elections can lead to the election of a less preferred 
candidate (see for example Fishburn (1986), Wright and Riker (1989)).  
                                                                 
1 The electoral system has no impact when there are two candidates. They position at the median of the 
spectrum: it is Black’s median voter theorem in the Downs-Hotelling framework. 
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The basic problem with a majority system when there are three or more candidates is a 
coordination problem: if the overall preferred candidate is perceived as having negligible 
chances of being in contention for victory, then voters are likely to vote for their favorite 
candidate among the two serious candidates. This is what often happens in the United 
Kingdom for example, where voters avoid “wasting” their vote on the Liberal Democrats as 
everybody expects either the Conservative or Labour parties to win. 
This means that beliefs play a key role in elections. This idea that beliefs about the 
probabilities of close races between the pairs of candidates influences the behavior of the 
voters as well as the positioning of the candidates was modeled by Myerson and Weber 
(1993). They, too, proved that when there are more than two candidates in a plurality 
system, any policy may win in equilibrium. The idea of the proof is that in such a strategic 
voting set-up, a candidate can be deterred from deviating closer to the median position, 
because his credibility can be lower in such a configuration and exclude him from the race 
for victory.  
The literature regarding runoff systems is quite limited. Fishburn and Brams (1981) show 
that a runoff election is not always able to elect the strict Condorcet candidate 
(corresponding to the candidate positioned the closest to the median). But their analysis 
holds the positioning of the candidates fixed.2 
 
Myerson and Weber (1993) only compare plurality and approval voting systems. The 
present work extends their model. It proposes a geometric interpretation of their belief 
                                                                 
2 Piketty (1995) develops a model of two successive elections rather than a runoff system. 
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concept that can be applied to a broad range of commonly observed electoral systems, and 
therefore enables me to compare them.  
Informally stated, the idea of the model is as follows. Each electoral system specifies how 
the platforms and scores of the candidates give rise to an outcome. A pivot-probability is 
associated to a pair of outcomes if geometrical analysis shows that they can compete against 
each other for victory. Beliefs about the pivot-probabilities are given exogenously. I model 
how the voters’ behavior depends on both their preferences and their beliefs. Taking the 
voters’ behavior into account, the parties position in order to maximize their chances to be in 
government. In each electoral system, equilibria are computed under all possible states of 
beliefs.  
I then illustrate the model by applying it to runoff majority systems. I show that as single-
ballot majority systems, runoff systems with three or more parties allow for the 
implementation of extreme policies. Furthermore, in equilibrium, two candidates are 
necessarily positioned symmetrically with respect to the median. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 presents the setting of the election. 
Section 2 analyses the voters’ behavior. Section 3 analyses the candidates’ behavior and 
presents the generalized concept of positional equilibrium. Section 4 considers a majority 
system and obtains a result corresponding to Myerson and Weber’s multiple equilibria result 
in a plurality election. Section 5 considers a runoff majority election where candidates are 
committed to their positions and illustrates voting behavior with the 2002 presidential French 
elections. Section 6 presents the main result. Section 7 informally extends the analysis to four 
parties and shows how the results are modified. Section 8 concludes. 
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1. The Set-Up 
The political space is represented by a one-dimensional [0, 100] segment. There are two 
sets of agents: voters and candidates. 
There are three candidates (denoted 1, 2 and 3). Denote by C the set of candidates and PC 
the set of subsets of candidates.  
The candidates can choose a position anywhere in the political space. They are electoralist 
in the sense that they choose their positions in order to maximize their chances of being in 
power alone or with another party. The position chosen by candidate i is denoted xi. Call X 
the set [0,100]3 Ì R3. Denote by x positional vector (x1, x2, x3), x Î X. 
The second set of agents is the set of voters. The voters’ ideal points are uniformly 
distributed over the set {0,1, …, 100}, with 1/101 of the voters having each ideal in this set. 
This position t of a voter’s bliss point is referred to as the voter’s type. 
The voters do not care which parties are in power, but only care about the implemented 
policy. The utility of a t-type voter if the implemented policy is z is:  
Ut(z) = - (z - t)2 
If policy z is proposed by some candidate i, this utility is sometimes denoted by ui(t). 
Note that given the voters’ preferences distribution and single-peakedness, the median 
voter’s bliss point is well-defined and equals 50. 
The present paper focuses on electoral systems where each voter casts a ballot for exactly 
one candidate, that is, no abstention nor multiple votes are allowed3. This will enable me to 
propose a geometric analysis. Indeed, if si denotes the percentage score of candidate i, I 
have  
                                                                 
3 Myerson and Weber (1993) study elections under plurality, approval and Borda count. 
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s1 + s2 + s3 = 1. 
The set of all possible results is a two-dimensional simplex, SS, that I represent in a normed 
plane whose axes are s1 and s2. Call s the vector (s1,s2,s3). The set of points corresponding 
to a constant score S of candidate i, {s Î SS : si = S} for some constant S with 0 £ S £ 1, 
is a line, called an iso-si line. 
  
  S2 s1 + s2 + s3 = 1
               (0,1,0) (a,b,c) = (s1,s 2,s 3)
    iso-s3 line =     = iso-s1 line
 
           = iso-s2 line
             (s2 = 0.5)
S1
      (0,0,1)                             (1,0,0)   
 Figure 1: The Score Simplex SS in a voting system with three candidates 4 
 
A simple outcome of an election, (W, z), is an element of PC x [0,100]: its first 
component is the subset W of candidates who are in power, and its second component is 
the implemented policy z. Call O the set of elements of PC x [0,100] and PO the set of 
subsets of O. 
An outcome is a set of equally likely simple outcomes (one of them being selected later by a 
coin toss), i.e. an element of PO. Note that all simple outcome singletons are outcomes, 
selected with probability 1. 
An electoral system ES with three candidates where voters cast a ballot for exactly one of 
them is a mapping of 6 variables which maps any point (s,x) Î SS x X on a set of equally 
likely outcomes: ES: SS x X ® PO:  (s,x) ® ES(s,x) Ì PO.  
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An electoral system is a mapping rather than a function because some (s,x) can lead to two 
or more tied outcomes (ties are broken by a fair coin). 
Let me call OS the electoral system mapping when x is given: "x OS(s) = ES(s,x).  
The reciprocal image of an outcome kÎOS(s) by OS is called an outcome zone. Thus the 
outcome zone corresponding to an outcome k, for a given positioning of the candidates, is 
the set of scores leading to this outcome k. 
The outcome simplex of an electoral system for a given positioning of the candidates is the 
score simplex divided in its different outcome zones. 
Border assumptions:  
1°) for any x Î X, all outcome zones are convex sets of the score simplex. 
2°) the borders between two outcome zones are straight lines. They have one of the 
following six directions: the three directions of the lines where the score of one party is 
constant (i.e. iso-si lines, i = 1,2,3) and their perpendiculars 
Border assumptions restrict the analysis to electoral systems such that a change in the set of 
parties in power happens when the score of some set of parties either reaches a threshold or 
reaches the score of another set of parties. 
Call PO(x) the set of possible outcomes (PO) under a given electoral system, given the 
candidate positioning vector x. Call PPO(x) the set of pairs of elements of PO(x).  
There is a close race between outcomes k and l where k,l Î PO(x), k ¹ l if the distance 
between point s in the outcome simplex and the frontier between OS-1(k) and OS-1(l) 
corresponds to at most one vote.  
                                                                                                                                                                                          
4 In order to emphasize the symmetry between the variables, the axes are positioned in a non-orthogonal 
way. The coordinates of a point are read as suggested. 
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As there is uncertainty on the realization of the type of each voter, there is some uncertainty 
about the scores that the candidates will obtain, even if the behavior of any type of voter is 
known. Call Si the expected percentage score of candidate i: Si = E(si). 
Following Myerson and Weber’s terminology, I denote the probability of a close race 
between two outcomes k and l by pkl and call it a pivot-probability.5 
A set of beliefs given an electoral system ES and its corresponding PPO is any function p 
mapping any positioning x of the candidates on a vector of pivot- probabilities between any 
two outcomes:  
p: X  ®  [0,1]# PPO(x): x ® p(x) with S(k,l)ÎPPO(x)pkl(x) £ 1. 
This means that (as in Myerson and Weber) the perception of the relative probabilities of 
close races between all pairs of outcomes depends on the relative positioning of the 
candidates. If a candidate i moves from xi to xi’, the pivot probabilities p(x) are transformed 
into p(x-i,xi’) (where (x-i,xi’) denotes the positioning vector if i deviates from xi to xi’) in a 
way described by the state of beliefs. 
All voters are given such a set of beliefs exogeneously. These beliefs are not necessarily 
common beliefs.6 
Connexity assumption: if two outcome zones OS-1(k) and OS-1(l) are not in contact for 
some positioning x or if they are connected by a single point, then pkl(x) = 0. 
                                                                 
5 I implicitly assume (as do Myerson and Weber) that the probability of three outcomes being in close 
race is infinitesimal in comparison to the probability of a two-outcome tie. 
6  Myerson and Weber assume common beliefs. They also argue that beliefs should be in accordance 
with the outcome they imply and introduce the so-called ordering condition. Our main results are true 
with or without common beliefs and an adapted ordering condition. 
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The connexity assumption simply asserts that there are enough voters so that one single 
voter is not able to make the score vector “jump” from one outcome zone to another if there 
is a third outcome zone between them. 
Call CR(x) the set of pairs of outcomes such that there can be a close race (CR) between 
them when the candidates hold position x.  
By connexity and border assumptions, pkl(x) can be strictly positive only if the frontier 
between OS-1(k) and OS-1(l) is a non degenerated segment:  
CR(x) = {(k,l) ÎPPO(x): the frontier between OS-1(k) and OS-1(l) is a segment}. 
As do Myerson and Weber, I assume that all possible pivot-probabilities are strictly 
positive: pkl(x) > 0 " (k,l) Î CR(x). 
2. The Voters’ Behavior 
When a voter has to decide how to vote, the positions of the candidates (the x vector) are 
known.  
Her behavior will then depend on two things: 1°) her preferences, and how far the 
candidates are from her bliss point, as she likes to encourage candidates as close as possible 
to her ideology, and 2°) her beliefs, as she does not want to spoil her ballot.  
The balance between these two elements depends on each voter’s personal situation and 
beliefs.  
Modeling this balancing is the object of this section and relates to the concepts of expected 
gain and prospective rating (following Myerson and Weber’s terminology). 
Let the candidate positioning vector be x and (k,l) Î CR(x). The expected gain of a type t 
voter with beliefs p(x) for voting for candidate i regarding the close race between 
outcomes k and l, denoted EGi(k,l)(t), is constructed as follows: 
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1°) If the frontier between OS-1(k) and OS-1(l) is an iso-si line for some candidate i: 
then one outcome, say k, corresponds to higher scores of candidate i, and the other to 
lower scores of i, i.e. higher scores of any of the other candidates. Thus,  
EGi(k,l)(t) = pkl(uk(t) - ul(t)), EGj(k,l)(t) = (1/2) pkl(ul - uk) for j ¹ i.7 
2°) If the frontier between OS-1(k) and OS-1(l) is perpendicular to an iso-Si: 
voting for i is not decisive from the point of view of the race between k and l: EGi(k,l)(t) = 0. 
Outcome k corresponds to a higher score for one of the other parties, say j, and lower 
scores of the last party j’, meaning that EGj(k,l)(t) = pkl (uk - ul); EGj’(k,l)(t) = pkl (ul - uk). 
 
 
 Voting for 2 favors outcome k
 Voting for 1 or 3 equally favors outcome l
   vote for 2
         k
         l
          vote for 3        vote for 1
 Voting for 2 on average is neutral
 Voting for 3 favors k
 Voting for 1 favors l
    vote for 2
          vote for 3        vote for 1
      
       k     l  
Figure 2: Expected gains relative to a close race between outcomes k and l according to the direction of 
the border between outcome zones OS-1 (k) and OS-1(l) 
 
The overall expected gain for a type t voter of voting for i, called prospective rating of 
candidate i and denoted PRi(t), is the sum of the expected gains relative to all possible 
close races: PRi(t) = S(k,l)ÎCREGi(k,l)(t). 
 
Behavior of voters:  
                                                                 
7 The expected gain pkl(ul - uk) is obtained by voting for any of the two candidates other than i and is 
therefore split between these two candidates: the  “1/2” coefficient guarantees that ScÎCEGc(t) = 0 "t. 
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A. If her beliefs are such that all pivot-probabilities are 0, the voter votes sincerely. Ties (in 
terms of utilities) are broken by a fair coin. 
B. If her beliefs are such that at least one pivot-probability is strictly positive, she votes for 
the candidate who maximizes her prospective ratings. Ties (in terms of prospective ratings) 
are broken by a fair coin. 
 
Thus, sincere voting is seen as the limit case when a voter believes her vote to change the 
outcome with probability 0 (case A). Expected utility maximization voting happens when the 
voter believes this probability to be positive, with the confrontation of her preferences and 
beliefs expressed in the candidates’ prospective ratings.8 For those voters in B, because the 
prospective rating is homogenous of degree 1 in p(x), the pivot probabilities for a given 
positioning of the candidates can be normalized so as to sum to 1 (without loss of 
generality): "x Î X , S(k,l)ÎCR(x)pkl(x) = 1. 
 
Let me insist on the fact that no voter is playing a game, as the prospective ratings do not 
depend on the behavior of the other voters (and does not even require them to know the 
voters’ distribution). Voters do not interact directly with each other.9 
 
Once candidate positioning x and pivot probabilities p(x) are given, the prospective ratings 
for all voters are determined. The strategic behavior of the voters determines the expected 
scores of the candidates, the expected possible outcomes and therefore the expected 
                                                                 
8 The results are robust to suppressing case A, i.e. with at least one pivot probability positive. 
9 Further generalization could allow the voters to play a Nash game. 
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probability of being in power (alone or with another candidate). These probabilities of 
winning are endogenous and should not be confused with the exogenous pivot probabilities. 
 
3. The strategies of the candidates - positional equilibrium concepts 
The strategies and actions of the candidates, decided before the election takes place, are 
examined here. 
An electoral system has been selected and is common knowledge. A state of beliefs is 
exogenously given. Each candidate wants to maximize his utility. 
I assume that being in power is a cake of size one, shared equally by the winning candidates. 
Therefore, if Pij represents the probability of candidate i winning together with j - 1 other 
candidates, j = 1, 2, 3 and Ui the utility of party i, I have: 
Ui = Pi1 + Pi2/2 + Pi3/3 (and SiUi = 1). 
A candidate’s only strategic choice is the position he chooses. His choice depends on the 
electoral system, on the positions of the other candidates and on the state of beliefs. 
Now, when optimally choosing his position, he takes the positions of the other candidates as 
given and computes the probability of being in power in each possible situation, which 
depends on the pivot probabilities for each of his positions. This means that, in general, the 
pivot probabilities “out of equilibrium”, i.e. the p(y)’s for positions y different from the 
equilibrium x vector, are not negligible.  
I now come to a general definition of positional equilibrium for an election involving three 
candidates in an electoral system ES. 
A situation is a positional equilibrium if there exists a set of beliefs function p(y) for each 
voter such that 
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1°) each voters maximize her expected utility; 
2°) the positioning of the candidates x is a Nash equilibrium given the voters’ behaviors 
under all positioning vectors.10 
 
Note that our definition of positional equilibrium is very weak in the sense that I assume no 
restriction on the state of beliefs function. Beliefs can change with a change of candidates 
positioning. Myerson and Weber (1993) do not impose either any restriction that would link 
beliefs across positions: a candidate, considered as a very serious contender under some 
positioning, might become a sure loser if she, or another candidate, rather picks a slightly 
different platform. I too choose to be as permissive as possible, since my  concept is 
sufficient to really discriminate across voting systems (as illustrated in a companion paper). 
 
4. Application to a Majority System 
This section applies the methodology of the second section to study a relative majority 
system and shows a very well established result, equivalent to Myerson and Weber 
(1993)’s theorem 3 for a plurality election in this generalized set-up. 
A relative majority system is defined as an electoral system in which the party which 
obtains the highest score, whatever its score, even if it is lower than half of the total of the 
votes, forms a government alone and implements the policy corresponding to its position xi.  
Thus the relative majority system maps (x,s) on outcome ({i}, xi) if si ³ sj, i,j Î C, j ¹ i.  
                                                                 
10  Fey (1997) argues that some voting equilibria proposed by Myerson and Weber (1993) are not stable. 
The present paper does not suffer from this critique, which concerns non Duvergerian equilibria with 
exogenous candidate positioning. 
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For any positioning of the candidates, the score simplex is divided in three outcome zones, 
according to which party has the largest score. 
 
  S2
               (0,1,0)
 2 wins
           (0,0.5,0.5)                (0.5,0.5,0)
               (1/3,1/3,1/3)
             3 wins               1 wins
S1
      (0,0,1)                  (0.5,0,0.5)                   (1,0,0)
 
Figure 3: The Outcome Simplex in a relative majority system with three parties 
 
Denote by i the ({i}, xi) outcome, i = 1,2,3. 
The border between any two outcome zones OS-1(i) and OS-1(j) is the segment {s: Si = Sj ³ 
Sk}. Thus CR(x) = {(1,2), (1,3), (2,3)} "x Î X and the possibly positive pivot-
probabilities are p12, p13 and p23. 
The expected gains are easy to construct: as all the outcome zones borders are 
perpendicular to an iso-score line, each pij affects only candidates i and j: EGi(i,j)(t) = pij(ui - 
uj), "i,j, i ¹ j, EGi(k,l)(t) = 0, "i,k,l, i ¹ k, i ¹ l, k ¹ l. And I obtain the following prospective 
ratings: PRi(t) = pij[ui(t) - uj(t)] + pik[ui(t) - uk(t)], "i,k,l, i ¹ k, i ¹ l, k ¹ l. 
This electoral system corresponds to Myerson and Weber (1993) plurality election, and my  
notations are chosen so as to coincide with theirs. 
In this set-up, I have the equivalent to Myerson and Weber’ theorem 3:  
 
Proposition 1: In a one round relative majority system, for any z strictly between 0 
and 100, policy z can be implemented in positional equilibrium. 
 14 
Proposition 1 also holds under common beliefs. 
Proof of proposition 1: see the appendix. The idea of the proof is similar to Myerson and 
Weber’s theorem 3. The authors show their result by constructing an example of an 
equilibrium whose winning policy is any z in the political spectrum: 1 positions at z, 2 at 50 
and 3 at 100 - z/2. They consider a situation with the common belief that p13 = 1 while p12 
and p23 are negligible: everybody believes that 2 has no chance of winning the election, 
avoids wasting her vote for this “more moderate” candidate and chooses between 1 and 3, 
giving the victory to the more centrist of them: candidate 1. 
This situation is an equilibrium for the following reason. Candidate 3 considers adopting a 
more centrist position to win the election. But he can be dissuaded from doing so, if beliefs 
in the alternative configuration (where he is closer to the center) give him no credibility as a 
serious contender: if he picks a central platform, the beliefs are p12 = 1 rather than p13 = 1. 
Myerson and Weber’s multiple equilibria result in a plurality election is easily interpreted in 
relative majority election where there are three parties: the largest party, whatever its score, 
even if it is lower than half of the total of the votes, gets the power. 
I show in the appendix that proposition 1 still holds if I add a coalition-proofness refinement 
à la Bernheim, Peleg and Whinston in the positioning game. 
As already mentioned, UK (at least before New Labour) is a good illustration of this result. 
 
5. Application to Runoff Systems 
A frequently observed electoral system is the double-ballot system, or majority runoff 
system. There are several versions of a majority runoff system. This paper adopts the 
following simple stylized definition. 
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A runoff majority system is defined as an electoral system in which, at the first ballot, 
voters cast a ballot for one of the candidates. If one candidate commands an absolute 
majority of votes, he wins the election. If no candidate receives more than half the votes, 
there is a runoff election between the first two candidates. The winner of the head-to-head 
runoff wins the election. 
Modified definition of simple outcome: a simple outcome is a simple outcome as defined 
in section 1, indexed by its history: if k is an outcome as defined before, let k denote 
“outcome k taking place after the first round” and ki “outcome k taking place after a second 
round against outcome i”. 
I assume the voter’s utility is independent of whether the winning outcome is selected at the 
first or at the second round: uk(t) = uki(t). 
Now there are possibly two ballots, the following question is raised: are the candidates 
allowed to change their positions between the first and the second round? The answer to this 
question influences the strategic behavior of both the voters and the parties. Here I consider 
committed candidates: they do not modify their platforms after the first round.11  
Now the election is possibly divided in two rounds, the analysis of the mapping and the 
pivot-probabilities seems more complicated. Nevertheless, the analysis of the second round 
(if there is any) is very simple: as the candidates do not relocate, the positioning vector x is 
given. The voting behavior of the voters in the second round is trivial, as there are two 
candidates: they vote for the candidate the closer to their ideal point, who provides them 
with the higher expected gain. 
                                                                 
11 The case of a runoff system with uncommitted parties could also be developed. 
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This means that if a second round opposes any two candidates i and j, the candidate closer 
to the median wins. This is expressed as follows, where d(x,y) denotes the Euclidian 
distance between x and y on the [0,100] segment: 
"i ¹ j, i,j Î C, let ivsj(x) denote outcome ij if d(xi,50) < d(xj,50); outcome ji if d(xj,50) < 
d(xi,50) and outcome {ij, ji} if d(xi,50) = d(xj,50). 
The runoff majority system mapping is the following: 
"i,j,j’Î C, i ¹ j, i ¹j’, j ¹ j’: 
ES(x,s) ' i if Si ³ 50%; 
ES(x,s) ' ivsj if Sk £ 50% "k, Si > Sj’ and Sj > Sj’; 
ES(x,s) ' {ivsj,ivsj’} if Sk £ 50% "k, Si > Sj’ = Sj; 
ES(x,s) ' {ivsj,ivsj’,jvsj’} if Sk £ 50% "k, Si = Sj’ = Sj. 
There are six outcome zones: three where one party i has more than 50%, leading to i, and 
three where none of them has 50% and a runoff must take place: 
 
   
  S2
               (0,1,0)
   2
 
           (0,0.5,0.5)                (0.5,0.5,0)
             2 vs 31 vs 2
                 3         1 vs 3       1
S1
      (0,0,1)                  (0.5,0,0.5)                   (1,0,0)
  
Figure 4: the outcome simplex under majority runoff system 
 
The behavior of the voters in the first round decides the outcome: once the first round results 
are given, the voters know what will happen in the second round.  
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CR(x) = {(1,1vs2(x)), (1,1vs3(x)), (2,1vs2(x)), (2,2vs3(x)), (3,1vs3(x)), (3,2vs3(x))} and 
the pivot-probabilities are of the type pi,ivsj, and pivsj,ivsk, i,j,k Î C, i ¹ j, i ¹k, j ¹ k. 
Expected gains are constructed: pivot-probabilities of the type pi,ivsj refer to iso-Si borders: 
EGi(i,ivsj) = pi,ivsj(ui - uivsj) and EGk(i,ivsj) = EGj(i,ivsj) = (1/2)pi,ivsj(uivsj - ui) while pivsj,ivsk type 
pivot-probabilities refer to the perpendicular direction: EGi(ivsj,ivsk) = 0, EGk(ivsk,ivsj) = 
pivsk,ivsj(uivsk - uivsj) and EGj(ivsk,ivsj) = pivsk,ivsj(uivsj - uivsk). PRi(t) = ShÎCREGih(t), i = 1,2,3. 
Here as in a plurality election, voters can encourage their second best to win against their 
worst choice. The mechanics are more complex though. Consider for example a voter who 
prefers candidate 1 to 2 and 2 to 3, with 2 more moderate than 1 and 1 more moderate 
than 3. Then that voter can encourage 3 to reach the second round so as to have him lose 
against 1 (while 2 would win against 1). 
Let me illustrate the voting behavior in a run-off election with the 2002 presidential election 
in France. How could LePen possibly obtain so many votes in the first round and so few in 
the second round? Consider left-wing Jospin and right-wing Chirac as the most serious 
contenders, together with (minor candidates and) far-right LePen as a focal underdog hated 
by a wide majority of the population.  
Assume Jospin (J), Chirac (C) and LePen (LP) positioned at 40, 60 and 90: x = (40, 60, 
90). 




               (0,1,0)
   C
 
           (0,0.5,0.5)                (0.5,0.5,0)
           CvsLP CvsJ
                 LP      LPvsJ         J
S1
      (0,0,1)                  (0.5,0,0.5)                   (1,0,0)  
Figure 5: the outcome simplex – France 2002 
  
Given their positioning, a second round between LePen and Chirac or Jospin would lead to 
Chirac or Jospin’s victory with certainty, while the outcome of a second round between 
Chirac and Jospin is uncertain. 
Assume you are a Chirac fan. Is it possible you vote for LePen in the first round? Yes, if you 
believe Chirac will reach the second round anyway (i.e. pCvsJ,CvsLP is the only positive pivot-
probability - normalized to 1). Since he is sure to win against LePen, but much less so 
against Jospin, LePen is the candidate you should push in the first round. 
Similarily, it is possible for a Jospin fan to vote for LePen: If you believe pCvsJ,JvsLP is the only 
positive pivot-probability, you should push LePen in order to have Jospin Vs. LePen in the 
second round. 
The actual results of the 2002 French presidential elections can be explained in the 
framework of this paper in, say, the following scenario: 
The electorate was partitioned into three groups (uniformly distributed among the ideological 
space for simplicity) regarding their perceptions of the election: Group 1 (50% of the 
population) think they can influence the final outcome with probability 0. Group 2 (25%) 
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perceive that pCvsJ,CvsLP is the only positive pivot-probability. Group 3 (the remaining 25%) 
perceive that pCvsJ,JvsLP is the only positive pivot-probability.  
In group 1 all people vote sincerely. In group 2 J and LP supporters vote for their preferred 
candidate while C supporters vote for C. In group 3, C and LP supporters vote for C while 
J supporters vote for LP. Aggregate votes in the first round lead to 50% > SC > SLP > SJ. In 
the second round SC » 85% > SLP » 15%. Thus a candidate like LePen can reach the 
second round and then score less than 20%.  
I am not suggesting that my model explains all votes for LePen, but I do believe that it is 
useful to note that the results can also be explained in a framework where the goal of voting 
is to influence the outcome rather than to “communicate” or to “protest”. The classic 
explanation, in this vein, is that voters used the first round as an opportunity to protest 
against corruption around Chirac and mainstream politics. 
 
6. The Result 
Once the voters’ behavior is understood, the strategic positioning of the candidates can be 
examined.  As in a plurality election, a strictly most extremist candidate cannot win, since he 
is the worst choice for an absolute majority in both rounds. The dynamics are different 
though, as to be selected for a second round is only useful for the more moderate of the two 
candidates. Nevertheless, the following result shows that here as in a plurality election, 
adopting a moderate platform does not guarantee winning, because of the manipulative 
power of beliefs.  
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Proposition 2: In a majority runoff system equilibrium, any policy can be 
implemented in equilibrium and at least two candidates are positioned 
symmetrically with respect to the median.  
Proposition 2 also holds under common beliefs (and the following proof is identical). 
Proof of proposition 2:  
Lemma 1: Under any state of beliefs, if x1 £ x2 < x3 £ 50, then 3 wins with probability 1 
Proof of lemma 1: 
In such a situation the prospective ratings are as follows: 
PR1(t) = p1,1vs2(u1 - u2) + p1,1vs3(u1 - u3) + p1vs2,2vs3(u2 - u3) + (1/2)p2,2vs3(u3 - u2); 
PR2(t) = (1/2)p1,1vs2(u2 - u1) + (1/2)p1,1vs3(u3 - u1) + p1vs2,1vs3(u2 - u3) +  p2,2vs3(u2 - u3); 
PR3(t) = (1/2)p1,1vs2(u2 - u1) + (1/2)p1,1vs3(u3 - u1) + p1vs2,1vs3(u3 - u2) +  (1/2)p2,2vs3(u3 - u2) 
+ p1vs2,2vs3(u3 - u2).  
Then PR3(t) > PR1(t) and PR3(t) > PR2(t) for any t such that t > (x2 + x3)/2.  
Thus 3 wins with probability 1. 
 
Lemma 2: Assume x1 < x2 = x3, with d(x1,50) > d(x2,50). Then 3 and 2 win with probability 
½. 
Proof of lemma 2: 
PR1(t) = p1,1vs2(u1 - u2) + p1,1vs3(u1 - u2); 
PR2(t) = (1/2)p1,1vs2(u2 - u1) + (1/2)p1,1vs3(u2 - u1); 
PR3(t) = (1/2)p1,1vs2(u2 - u1) + (1/2)p1,1vs3(u2 - u1).  
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Then PR3(t) = PR2(t) > PR1(t) for any t such that t > (x1 + x2)/2, leading to a secound round 
between 1 and 2 or 3 with equal probabilities, with 1 losing if more extremist, and winning 
with probability ½ otherwise.  
 
Lemma 3: If there is a strictly most extremist candidate, he wins with probability 0. 
Proof of lemma 3: 
Assume there is a strictly most extremist candidate, call him 1 and assume by symmetry that 
x1 < 50 and x1 < x2 £ x3, with x3 < 100 - x1. 
Assume that 1 win with a strictly positive probability. 
Then by lemma 2, x1 < x2 < x3 and by lemma 1, 50 < x3.  
 Then one candidate among {2,3} wins with a probability strictly smaller than 1/2. But then 
this candidate deviates to the other one, and will win with probability 1/2 by lemma 2. Thus 
in equilibrium 1 must win with probability 0. 
 
Lemma 4: A situation with x1 < x2 = x3, with d(x1,50) < d(x2,50) is not an equilibrium. 
Proof of lemma 4: 
Assume it is an equilibrium. Then 1 wins with probability 1, otherwise he would deviate to 
50 and win with probability 1 by lemma 1. 
Therefore 2 and 3 are sure losers. But then 2 would deviate to 1 and win with probability ½ 
by lemma 2. 
 
Proof of proposition 2: 
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1) A situation with all parties positioned at the median is an equilibrium: all prospective 
ratings are 0 and all parties win with probability 1/3, while if one party deviates it wins with 
probability 0 by lemma 2. 
2) A situation where two parties are positioned symmetrically around 50 with the third party 
at 50 is a positional equilibrium. 
Consider that d(x1,50) = d(x2,50) with x3 = 50, x1 £ x2 and any state of beliefs such that 
p1,1vs2(x1,x2,z) = p2,1vs2(x1,x2,z) @ 1/2 for any z, p1vs3,1vs2 (z, x2, 50) @ 1 if z < 50 and z ¹ x1,  
and p2vs3,1vs2 (x1, z, 50) @ 1 if z > 50 and z ¹ x2. 
PR1 = 1/2.(p1,1vs2 + 1/2.p2,1vs2 )(u1 - u2) + negligible terms > 0 for any t < 50; 
PR1 = 1/2.(p1,1vs2 + 1/2.p2,1vs2 )(u1 - u2) + negligible terms < 0 for any t > 50; 
PR2 = 1/2.(p2,1vs2 + 1/2.p1,1vs2 )(u2 - u1) + negligible terms > 0 for any t > 50; 
PR2 = 1/2.(p2,1vs2 + 1/2.p1,1vs2 )(u2 - u1) + negligible terms < 0 for any t < 50; 
PR3 = 1/4.(p1,1vs2 - p2,1vs2 )(u2 - u1) + negligible terms @ 0 for any t; 
Thus, 50% > S1 = S2 > S3 . 
This situation is a positional equilibrium, for all parties can be prevented from deviating. 
Indeed, candidate 1 is dissuaded as follows (a similar argument applies to 2): if 1 deviates to 
z > 50 then his probability to win is 0 as 3 then wins with probability 1 by lemma 1. If 1 
deviates to 50, then he wins with probability 1/2 by lemma 2. If he deviates to z < 50, the 
belief that p1vs3,1vs2 @ 1 imply the prospective ratings become either PR1 @ 0, PR2 = u2 - u3 + 
negligible terms @ - PR3 if 2 is more moderate than 1, or PR1 @ 0, PR2 = u1 - u3 + negligible 
terms @ - PR3 otherwise and 3 wins in the first round. 
Candidate 3 can be deterred from moving by simply p1,1vs2 (x1,x2,z) = p2,1vs2 (x1,x2,z) @ 1/2 
for any z, as the prospective ratings are maintained. 
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Note that it is not necessary that some party occupy the median position. 
3) It is now sufficient to note that if no pair of candidates is positioned symmetrically with 
respect to the median, the most extremist candidate is a sure loser and wins with a strictly 
positive probability by joining the most moderate party by lemma 2.    
 
The appendix shows that the result is robust to the introduction of coalition-proofness. 
Therefore, neither single nor double ballots majority systems guarantee political moderation. 
The equilibria look quite different though: while about any configuration of candidates is 
possible under single ballot elections, an interesting symmetry occurs with two ballots.   
France is a natural illustration to proposition 2. I observe no strong convergence, the two 
serious contenders being usually one moderate left-wing candidate and one moderate right-
wing candidate, with some power alternance over time and one smaller party (typically 
either right-wing or far-right). 
Note that if repositioning by the candidates is allowed between the second and the third 
rounds, a median voter result can easily be proven. 
7. Extension to Four Candidates 
The purpose of this section is to show informally how the most important results change with 
the number of parties. 
If there are four parties, the score simplex is three-dimensional. Outcome zones are three 
dimension convex volumes. Outcomes are possibly in close race if they are connected by a 
plane surface. Pivot probabilities, prospective ratings and equilibrium concepts are 
constructed in a way similar to the 3 party case (see the appendix). 
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Consider first a majority system. The electoral mapping is constructed exactly as in the three 
party case. Pivot-probabilities are still of the form pij, " i ¹ j. And pij only affects PRi and 
PRj. Unsurprisingly, Proposition 1 still holds if there are 4 parties: 
Proposition 1 bis: In a majority system with four candidates, any policy can be 
implemented in equilibrium.  
Proof: Similar to proposition 1 and Myerson and Weber’s corresponding result. Available 
from the author. This result easily generalizes to any n ³ 3. 
 
In a runoff system, the three candidate case can be considered as very particular: since the 
first round selects two parties, it equivalently gets rid of one party. This is no longer true with 
four candidates. 
The electoral mapping is constructed exactly as in the three party case. Pivot-probabilities 
are still of the form pi,i+j and pi+j,i+k "i," j ¹ i, k ¹ i, k ¹ j. Pivot probability pi,i+j affects the 
prospective ratings relative to all parties while pi+j,i+k only affects PRj and PRk. 
Proposition 2 bis: In a runoff system with 4 committed candidates, any policy can 
win in equilibrium. 
Proof: Similar to proposition 2. Available from the author. This result extends to any number 
of parties and is robust to coalition-proofness. 
The main implication of propositions 2 and 2bis is that runoff systems are unable to 
guarantee more moderation than a majority system if candidates are not able to reposition 
between rounds. 
With regards to my  results, the hope of Piketty (1995) to allow for an efficient separation of 
the communication and decision making purposes of voting by implementing a runoff election 
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seems to be vain: the first round can be decisive and therefore voting in the first round is 
highly strategic (as shown in the example pages 17-18). 
 
7. Conclusion and Discussion 
This paper constructs a general model allowing the study of a large range of electoral 
systems with three and four parties. This spatial model, with endogenous positioning of the 
candidates and sophisticated voters, enables to compare equilibria in a unified set-up 
potentially involving a wide range of electoral systems. My  basic model develops a three 
party set-up. The analysis is extended to a four party set-up in the appendix. 
The overall results of the paper can be summarized as follows. 
My  result regarding a majority system includes Myerson and Weber (1993)’s result of 
multiple equilibria in a plurality system. It is interpreted as a result of inability for a majority 
system to guarantee any moderation of policy.  
I modeled a runoff system and showed that such systems are not able to guarantee 
moderate outcomes either. All equilibria present an interesting symmetry. 
In a companion paper I examine proportional systems and show how different coalition 
formation rules can be incorporated into the theoretical analysis. I show that they crucially 
affect the moderation capacity of a proportional system.  
 
The belief concept I used is also driving the positional equilibrium concept in Myerson and 
Weber (1993). It is central to the results and should be briefly discussed. It is weak in the 
following sense: the beliefs are allowed to vary without restriction with the change of 
positioning of a party. This is sometimes unrealistic and implies that beliefs are very 
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powerful. Nevertheless, this concept of beliefs is sufficient to discriminate across systems, as 
my results attest. What makes the results change across systems is the structure of possible 
beliefs themselves.  
In any case, I think that the concept of pivot-probability remains very natural and relevant in 
this kind of set-up. Future research should try to explore further this belief concept and to 
find an appropriate way of imposing more structure on the state of belief function, in order to 
avoid caricatured beliefs.  
This model is a first attempt to compare the major electoral systems in a unified set-up and 
brings realistic new results. It is quite general and could be used to study different versions of 
these systems, or different systems, as long as voters are assumed to cast a ballot for exactly 
one candidate or party. 
A weakness of this paper certainly is the exogeneity of the number of parties. I neglect the 
possibility of a correlation between the number of parties and the electoral system, which 
should be taken into account when comparing voting systems. 
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Appendix 1: Technical Proofs 
 
Proof of proposition 1 (including coalition-proofness): 
First consider the positional equilibrium case. For reasons of symmetry, I only construct an 
example of an equilibrium whose outcome z is anywhere between 1 and 50: x = (z, 50, 100 
- z/2). Consider a state of beliefs such that p13(z,x2,100 - z/2) » 1 "x2, p12(z,x2,x3) » 1 "x2 
and "x3 ¹ 100 - z/2, and any pivot-probabilities otherwise. As p13(x) » 1, party 1 wins. 
Candidate 1 does not deviate, as he is the winner. 2 does not deviate since p13(z,x2,100 - 
z/2) » 1 "x2. 3 does not deviate since p12(z,x2,x3) » 1 "x2 and "x3 ¹ 100 - z/2. 
Further more, this situation is coalition-proof if the state of beliefs is also such that: 
p13(z,x2,x3) » 1 " x2 ¹ 50, " x3  ¹ 100 - z/2 and x3  ¹ z  (a1), 
p12(z,x2,x3) » 1 " x2 ¹ 50, x3  = z  (a2).  
Indeed the only possible deviating coalition is formed by 2 and 3 but 1°) a deviation to x’ = 
(z, x2 ,x3) if x3 ¹ z does not make 2 better off; 2°) a deviation to x’ = (z,x2,z) with x2 ¹ 50 
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does not make 3 better off;  3°) a deviation to x’ = (z,z,z) is not self-enforcing either: it 
implies P = (1/3,1/3,1/3) and 2 deviates back to 50 and wins for sure (since all pivot-
probabilities are strictly positive). 
Proof of coalition-proofness in proposition 2: 
This situation is possible in coalition-proof equilibrium, for example if the beliefs also satisfy 
p1,1vs3(x1,z,100-x1) = p3,1vs3(x1,z,100 - x1) @ 1/2 for any z, (a3); 
p1vs3,1vs2 (x1, x1, z) @ 1 for any z with x1 < z < 100 - x1 (a4); 
 p1vs3,1vs2 (z, x2, 50) @ 1 if z < 50 and p2vs3,1vs2 (x1, z, 50) @ 1 if z > 50. 
Indeed, a self-enforcing coalition including 1 or 2 requires him to win with a probability 
strictly superior to 1/2.  
Thus, for reasons of symmetry, I will consider any collective deviation by 2 and 3 leading to 
P2 > 1/2 and P3 > 0, with x’2 ¹ x2, x’3 ¹ x3 and x1 fixed and show that it is not self-
enforcing. By lemma 3, I must have x1  £ x’2 £ 100 - x1 and x1  £ x’3 £ 100 - x1.  
If x1  = x’2 = x’3, Pi = 1/3 for any candidate. 
If x1  = x’2 and x’3 = 100 - x1, P2 = 0 by (a3). 
If x1  = x’2 < x’3  < 100 - x1, then P3 = 1 by (a4).  
If x1  = x’3 < x’2  < 100 - x1, 3 must win with probability ³ 1/2, since otherwise he deviates 
further to x’3 and wins with probability 1/2 by lemma 2. This contradicts the condition that 2 
wins with probability > 1/2. 
If x1  < x’2 = x’3  < 100 - x1, then 2 and 3 win with probability 1/2 by lemma 2. 
If x1  < x’2 < x’3  < 100 - x1, or x1  = x’3 < x’2  < 100 - x1, the one who wins with 
probability < 1/2 deviates to the other and wins with probability 1/2 by lemma 2. 
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I just showed that there is no self-enforcing deviation by 2 and 3, and can show a symmetric 
result for 1 and 3. There is no collective deviation by 1 and 2 since the situation is Pareto-
efficient for {1,2}: U1 + U2 = 1. 
 
 
Appendix 2: The case of 4 Candidates 
Formalization with four candidates: 
Call C the set of candidates {1,2,3,4} and X the positioning vector of the candidates. 
Consider the same world as in section 1. 
If si denotes the percentage score of candidate i, I have s1 + s2 + s3 + s4 = 1 and the set of 
all possible results is a three dimensional simplex, SS. It can be represented by a tetrahedron 
within a three-dimensional non orthogonal repere. Call s the vector (s1,s2,s3,s4). The set of 
points corresponding to a constant score S of candidate i, {s Î SS : si = S} for some 
constant S with 0 £ S £ 1, is a plane surface, called an iso-si plane. 
An electoral system ES is a mapping of 8 variables which maps any point (s,x) Î SS x X 
on a set of equally likely outcomes: ES: SS x X ® GK:  (x,s) ® ES(x,s) Ì GK. 
Convexity assumption: all outcome zones are convex sets. 
Border assumption: the borders between two outcome zones are plane surfaces. They 
have one of the following directions: the directions of the planes where the score of one 
party is constant (i.e. iso-si lines, i = 1,2,3), the planes perpendicular to two such directions 
and the plane such that the sum of two scores sum up to a constant number. 
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Connexity assumption: if for some positioning x two outcome zones OS-1(k) and OS-1(l) 
are not in contact, if they are connected by a single point, or a single segment, then pkl(x) = 
0. 
Lemma: For any xÎX and any (k,l)ÎPO(x), pkl(x) can be strictly positive only if the frontier 
between OS-1(k) and OS-1(l) is a place surface. 
CR(x) = {(k,l) ÎPPO(x): the frontier between OS-1(k) and OS-1(l) is a plane surface}. 
The expected gain for a type t voter of voting for candidate i relative to the close race 
between outcomes k and l, denoted EGi(k,l)(t), is constructed as follows: 
1°) If the frontier between OS-1(k) and OS-1(l) is an iso-si surface plane for some candidate 
i:  
then one outcome, say k, corresponds to higher scores of candidate i, and the other to 
lower scores of i, i.e. higher scores of any of the other candidates. Thus, EGi(k,l)(t) = pkl(uk(t) 
- ul(t)), EGj(k,l)(t) = 1/3. pkl(ul - uk) for j ¹ i. 
2°) If the frontier between OS-1(k) and OS-1(l) is perpendicular to an iso-Si and an iso-Sh: 
voting for i or h is not decisive from the point of view of the race between k and l: EGi(k,l)(t) 
= EGh(k,l)(t) = 0. Outcome k corresponds to a higher score for one of the other parties, say 
j, and lower scores of the last party j’, meaning that EGj(k,l)(t) = pkl (uk - ul); EGj’(k,l)(t) = pkl 
(ul - uk). 
2°) If the frontier between OS-1(k) and OS-1(l) is a plane where Si + Sh = a constant: 
then one outcome, say k, corresponds to higher scores of candidate i and another 
candidate, say g, and the other to higher scores of h, and some other candidate, say j. Thus, 




The relative majority system mapping maps (x,z) on outcome (i, xi) if si ³ sj, i,j Î C, j ¹ i.  
The border between any two outcome zones OS-1(i) and OS-1(j) is the plane surface {s: Si 
= Sj ³ Sk}. Thus CR(x) = {(1,2), (1,3), (2,3), (1,4),(2,4),(3,4)} "x Î X and the possibly 
positive pivot-probabilities are the pij,’s, "i,j ÎC, i ¹ j. 
As all the outcomes zones borders are perpendicular to an iso-score place, each pij affects 
only candidates i and j: EGi(i,j)(t) = pij(ui - uj), "i,j, i ¹ j, EGi(k,l)(t) = 0, "i,k,l, i ¹ k, i ¹ l, k ¹ 
l. And I obtain the following prospective ratings: PRi(t) = Sj pij[ui(t) - uj(t)], "i, "j ¹ i. 
 
Runoff system with committed parties 
The analysis of the second round is very simple, as in section 5: if a second round opposes 
any two candidates i and j, the candidate closer to the median wins. 
The runoff majority system with committed parties  mapping is the following: 
"i,j,j’,i’ Î C, i ¹ j, i ¹j’, j ¹ j’, i’ ¹ i, i’ ¹j, i’ ¹ j’: 
ES(x,s) ' i if Si ³ 50%; 
ES(x,s) ' ivsj if Sk £ 50% "k, Si > Sj > Sj’ and Sj > Si’; 
ES(x,s) ' {ivsj,ivsj’} if Sk £ 50% "k, Si > Sj’ = Sj > Si’; 
ES(x,s) ' {ivsj,ivsj’,ivsi’} if Sk £ 50% "k, Si > Sj’ = Sj = Si’; 
ES(x,s) ' {ivsj,ivsj’,jvsj’} if Sk £ 50% "k, Si = Sj’ = Sj > Si’; 
ES(x,s) ' {ivsj,ivsj’,jvsj’,ivsi’,jvsi’,j’vsi’} if Sk £ 50% "k, Si = Sj’ = Sj = Si’; 
CR(x) = {(1,1vs2(x)), (1,1vs3(x)), (1,1vs4(x), (2,1vs2(x)), (2,2vs3(x)), (2,2vs4(x)), 
(3,1vs3(x)), (3,2vs3(x)), (3,3vs4(x)), (4,4vs1(x)), (4,4vs2(x)), (4,4vs3(x))}. And therefore 
the pivot probabilities are of the type pi,ivsj, and pivsj,ivsk, i,j,k Î C, i ¹ j, i ¹k, j ¹ k. 
 33 
Expected gains are constructed: Pivot probabilities of the type pi,ivsj refer to iso-Si planes: 
EGi(i,i+j) = pi,i+j(ui - uivsj) and EGk(i,ivsj) = EGj(i,ivsj) = EGl(i,ivsj) = (1/3)pi,ivsj(uivsj - ui) while 
pivsj,ivsk type pivot probabilities refer to the perpendicular direction: EGi(ivsj,ivsk) = EGl(ivsj,ivsk) 
= 0, EGk(ivsk,ivsj) = pivsk,ivsj(uivsk - uivsj) and EGj(ivsk,ivsj) = pivsk,ivsj(uivsj - uivsk). PRi(t) = 
ShÎCREGih(t), i = 1,2,3,4. 
  
